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State Recoupment of the Costs of Defense
of Indigent Criminal Defendants
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to adequate
representation by counsel has long been recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court as being a requisite of a fair and meaningful trial.1
In order that the scope of the right be not dependent on the indi-
vidual's financial ability,2 an indigent defendant will be appointed
counsel in federal court 3 and, more recently by virtue of the Four-
teenth Amendment, in state courts.4 The result is that without an
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense
unless represented by qualified counsel at his trial.5
The implimentation of the constitutionally implied right to ap-
pointed counsel of indigent criminal defendants, has imposed a
financial burden upon the individual states, of some significance.6
Inevitably, many states have attempted to recoup some of these
monies from the defendants themselves. Though diverse in their
approach, these efforts at requiring reimbursement of the costs of
defense raise common issues as to their constitutional propriety. 7
Among the challenges most frequently asserted against recoupment
schemes are: that they deny due process when payment is required
of an acquitted defendant;8 that conditioning release upon repay-
ment results in imprisonment for debt;9 that the existence of such
a plan would render invalid any waiver of counsel;10 and that a
"chilling" of a constitutionally protected right would result." A
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
6. Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 508, 256 A.2d 500 (1969).
7. See generally, Comment, Reimbursement of Defense Costs as a Con-
dition of Probation for Indigents, 67 MIcH. L.R. 1404 (1969).
8. Woodbury County v. Anderson, 164 N.W.2d 129 (Ia. 1969); Giaccio
v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
9. Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789, 793 (M.D. Tenn. 1969);
Wright v. Mathews, 209 Va. 246, 249, 163 S.E.2d 158, 159-60 (1968); see also,
Charging Costs of Prosecution to the Defendant, 59 Geo. L.J. 991, 999-1002
(1971) and 67 MIcH L.R. 1404, 1418-1419 (1967).
10. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
11. State ex rel. Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash. 2d 676, 521 P.2d 706 (1974);
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study of these and other potential infirmities in light of the
practical realities of the situation, by an ABA committee chaired
by Chief Justice Burger, has resulted in a recommendation against
the application of recoupment schemes.
12
Though the Supreme Court had constitutionally limited the
methods of state recoupment provisions, it generally avoided predi-
cating its decisions on Sixth Amendment grounds by finding a
violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and not reaching the more specific issue.' 3 Only in dicta had
the court expressed an opinion on the propriety of charging costs
to an indigent defendant at all.14 The absence of a ruling on the
point created a judicial vacuum which fostered conflicting decisions
in state and lower federal courts.15 It was with the purpose of
bringing order to the area, that the court decided the case of Fuller
v. Oregon.'6
THE CASE
Prince Eric Fuller was charged by information with sodomy in
the third degree. Due to his assertion of indigence, a local attorney
was appointed by the court pursuant to statute,17 and represented
him at all subsequent court proceedings. Counsel incurred investi-
gative fees in aid of Fuller's defense which were assumed by the
county as well. Following his plea of guilty to the charge, Fuller
was sentenced to five years of probation conditioned upon his com-
pletion of a one year work release program at the county jail which
would enable him to attend college, and reimbursement of the
county for the costs of his defense which it incurred as a result
of his indigent status.
Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971), af'd on other grounds,
407 U.S. 128 (1972); In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr.
207 (1969).
12. A.B.A., Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, 58-59 (ap-
proved draft 1968).
13. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305 (1966).
14. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1966).
15. Compare, State v. Foust, 13 N.C. App. 382, 185 S.E.2d 718 (1972),
and Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 508, 526 A.2d 500 (1969), with citations
supra note 11.
16. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
17. ORE. REV. SMAT. § 135.320(3) (a) (1974).
IThe statutory provisions under which repayment was required
are detailed with respect to the personal protection provided the
defendant. Under Oregon law a convicted person could be required
to repay all or a portion of the specially incurred costs of his prose-
cution. Such costs do not include those arising from a constitution-
ally guaranteed jury trial or for the support of any public agency,
such as the prosecutor's office, which are incurred irrespective of
the particular offense. Costs can be assessed only to the extent
that the defendant will be able to repay in light of his financial
situation and the potential burden they impose. The court, on peti-
tion, may remit all or any part of costs so charged, on a showing
of "manifest hardship" on the defendant or his immediate family.'
The terms of repayment may be established by the court, and the
court may condition probation or suspension of sentence on fulfill-
ment of the prescribed terms.19 A default in payment, unless
shown to be unintentional, or not as a result of a failure to make
a good faith effort to pay, may result in a finding of contempt of
court and imprisonment for a defined period. Additionally, a de-
fault in payment may be collected by any legal means authorized
for enforcement of a judgement.20
Fuller on appeal, contended that his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights had been breached by conditioning probation
upon repayment of the costs of his defense. The Oregon Court of
Appeals, with a single dissent, affirmed the sentence imposed by
the lower court, finding the challenged statutory sections to be suf-
ficiently well drafted to provide the indigent with a level of protec-
tion which would minimize any chilling effect, and an absence of
invidious discrimination in the manner in which it was to be
applied.2' After the State Supreme Court denied a petition for
review, the U.S. Supreme Court, in light of the conflicting author-
ities, granted certiorari. The issue as framed was whether a state
may require repayment of the costs of furnishing counsel to a con-
victed defendant who, though indigent at the time of the proceed-
ing, subsequently obtains the means necessary to satisfy such costs.
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT ISSUE
Does the possibility of imposition of costs on an indigent defend-
ant infringe upon his right to the assistance of court appointed
counsel? A provision, the purpose of which is to "chill" the asser-
18. OREs RFv. STAT. § 161.665 (1974).
19. ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.675 (1974).
20. ORE. REv. STAT. § 161.685 (1974).
21. State v. Fuller, 12 Ore. App. 152, 504 P.2d 1393 (1973).
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tion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exer-
cise them is unconstitutional.22 The leading case finding such a
"chilling" effect in recoupment statutes is the California Supreme
Court's decision of In re Allen.23 On facts similar to Fuller, a lower
court had exercised its statutory authority24 to impose all "other
reasonable conditions," on probation by requiring repayment of
costs. The California Supreme Court concluded that the very
existence of such authority would discourage the acceptance of the
services of counsel deemed essential by Gideon. Additionally, the
validity of any waiver would be suspect under the mandate of
Argersinger. The Allen decision was found persuasive by other
courts25 and provided the essence of Fuller's argument with regard
to this issue.
The California rule has been subjected to valid criticism. The
apparently prohibitive, high costs of a court action 'have not been
deemed to be a sufficient excuse for the failure of a non-indigent
to assert a right in a civil matter.26 No "chilling" effect of constitu-
tional proportions is recognized in such a case. In light of this
holding, it has been inferred that the Allen position has perverted
the purpose of the Supreme Court in its Gideon and Miranda deci-
sions of, "making indigents equal with other members of society
before the bar of justice and not putting them in a preferred posi-
tion.' '27 That such an application of the Sixth Amendment would
result in discrimination against non-indigents, especially those of
meager financial resources, has been the basis of decisions expressly
disavowing Allen.2 8
22. U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
23. 71 Cal. 2d 388, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207, 455 P.2d 143 (1969).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1970).
25. Supra note 11.
26. Ackerman v. U.S., 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950) held that a defendant's
failure to appeal within the statutory period from a judgment of denaturali-
zation, because his attorney advised him that he would have to sell his
home to pay the costs, was not "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b) (6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as would allow relief from
judgment.
27. 58 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 257 (1970).
28. State v. Fuller, 12 Ore. App. 152, 504 P.2d 1393 (1973); State v.
Foust, 13 N.C. App. 382, 185 S.E.2d 718 (1972).
In his argument, Fuller relied on U.S. v. Jackson and its prog-
eny,29 asserting that though his appointed counsel had been ade-
quate, his Constitutional right to representation had in fact been
chilled by the knowledge that he might be required to bear the
defense costs. The court, however, criticized the reasoning of Allen,
noting the infirmities alluded to above 0 The crux of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee is the availability of counsel whose presence
is required to ensure a fair trial. Given the realities of legal repre-
sentation in modern society, it is not necessarily of constitutional
significance that an indigent may be called upon to pay his costs
at some future time.
A defendant in a criminal case who is just above the line separat-
ing the indigent from the non-indigent, must borrow money, sell
off his meager assets, or call upon his family or friends in order
to hire a lawyer. We cannot say that the Constitution requires that
those only slightly poorer must remain forever immune from any
obligation to shoulder the expenses of their legal defense, even
when they are able to pay without hardship.3 1
The reliance on Jackson and related decisions was found by the
court to be inappropriate.32 Statutes invalidated by the rule of
these cases had no proper purpose but the chilling of a constitu-
tional right,33 while the decision of the Fuller majority implies that
the recoupment of funds by a State is a constitutionally valid pur-
pose. 34 This is the first decision by the Supreme Court to that
effect.3 5
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ISSUE
Fuller also contended that the Oregon recoupment statutes
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by classifying defendants in a constitutionally improper manner in
29. Uniformed Sanitation Men Assn., Inc. v. Commissioner, 392 U.S. 280
(1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968).
30. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 51-54 (1974).
31. Id. at 53-54.
32. Id. at 54.
33. Supra note 22.
34. The use of similar authority in In re Allen is criticized as not being
supported by the facts of that case, since the others were decided to remedy
substantial injury while the only detriment facing defendant in Allen,
would be being placed on the same ground as a non-indigent defendant.
Supra note 27 at 257-258.
35. The court, in dicta, had stated earlier, "We may assume that a legis-
lature could validly provide for replenishing a county treasury from the
pockets of those who have directly benefitted from county expenditures."
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
[voL. 2: 426, 1975] Indigent Criminal Defendants
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
two respects . 6 The court had previously struck down other state
recoupment systems on this ground.87 In his first Equal Protection
argument Fuller relied on James v. Strange which invalidated a
Kansas recoupment statute specifically denying to a convicted
criminal defendant, most rights afforded other debtors. This was
held to be an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Fuller argued that the Oregon statute, as applied,
suffered from the same constitutional defect.
The court however, distinguished the Kansas case since the
Oregon Court of Appeals had interpreted the challenged statute,
which docketed costs as a civil debt,88 as not denying any of the
exemptions from execution available to judgment debtors.39 The
majority's ruling that the statutory scheme was not discriminatory
as applied, was a matter viewed by the dissent as being of ultimate
significance to the outcome. Under Oregon law, a convicted
criminal defendant, having costs assessed against him, could have
his probation revoked and thus be imprisoned for his failure to pay
this civil debt. In contrast, a non-indigent defendant who refuses
to pay the fees of an attorney retained for his defense, cannot be
imprisoned, under Article I, section 19 of the Oregon Constitution
which forbids imprisonment for debt. This aspect of the Equal Pro-
tection argument, raised for the first time on appeal, in an amicus
brief filed by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, was
viewed as not having been properly preserved, by both the majority
and Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion. Yet the major-
ity rendered an advisory opinion on the issue presented.40
The majority indicates that the revocation of probation resulting
in imprisonment would be for deliberate non-compliance with a
court order rather than the mere failure to satisfy a debt.41 The
36. Supra note 16.
37. Supra note 13.
38. ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.180 (1974).
39. State v. Fuller, 12 Ore. App. 152, 159, 504 P.2d 1393, 1397 (1973).
40. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas criticizes the dissent's re-
sult as being based on a construction of a state constitution never rendered
by a court of that state. He also comments on the inappropriateness of
giving an advisory opinion in a "vacuum", i.e., not supported by any record
below, as done by the majority. Supra, 417 U.S. at 58-59.
41. Id. at 46.
sanction would'be imposed on the defendant not in his status as
a civil debtor in default, but as a probationor who has willfully
violated the condition of his probation. Therefor the conditioning
of probation on repayment does not, "impose unduly harsh or dis-
criminatory terms solely because the obligation is to the public
treasury rather than a private creditor, '42 but merely provides the
court with the customary means of enforcing its commands. The
dissent disputes the majority's reasoning 43 and distinguishes the
willful failure to pay a fine on order, properly a contempt of court
and violation of condition of probation from a situation involving
default on a civil debt not susceptible to such penal measures. 44
The second Equal Protection question raised dealt with the
recoupment statute's imposition of costs only on convicted indigent
defendants and not those who are acquitted or against whom
charges are dismissed. The court, applying the "rational basis" test,
concluded that this aspect of the statute represents a rational classi-
fication based on the equities of the situation, and is therefor wholly
non-invidious, comporting well with prior decisions relating to the
issue.45
CONCLUSIONS
The Fuller decision presents a refinement in scope of the Sixth
Amendment. It does not at all erode the absolute right of the indi-
gent criminal defendant to have competent counsel appointed by
the court irrespective of his present or potential financial status.
To this extent the holding reaffirms the belief that effective legal
representation is essential to the accomplishment of complete jus-
tice.46 Yet, the court's ruling requires that even the indigent, in
determining the course and quality of his defense, be influenced
by the economic realities of the decision. However fiscally realistic
the decision, its impact would be unduly harsh but for the narrow-
ness of the rule it formulates. The case's true significance appears
not to be in the redefinition of a constitutional right, but rather
the requirements now imposed on recoupment systems affecting the
exercise of that right.
42. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 138 (1972).
43. Supra 417 U.S. at 61, n.l.
44. Ex parte Wilson, 183 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
45. State v. Foust, 13 N.C. App. 382, 185 S.E.2d 718 (1972). Opinion of
the Justices, 109 N.H. 508, 256 A.2d 500 (1969).
46. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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A chilling effect of constitutional proportions will exist if costs
are to be assessed during defendant's indigency. A statute, care-
fully drawn to provide that reimbursement will be required only
if, and to the extent, that solvency is attained, will reduce the chill
exerted to a degree no greater than that which generally confronts
the marginal non-indigent. Such a scheme should provide a
mechanism for the reconsideration of the measure of costs so im-
posed, to prevent the debtor from being unduly burdened by a
change in circumstance.4 7 Since the exercise of the Sixth Amend-
ment right will be based on defendant's understanding of the
recoupment system, to eliminate any resulting claim of chill, a
court, at the time that indigence is established, should take care
to explain the exact nature of the financial obligations which the
indigent may possibly incur by his decision to accept the services
of court appointed counsel. 48 The defendant's perception of the
nature of his rights is as critical to their enjoyment as the structure
of the statutes guaranteeing them.
The controversy among the members of the court as to the Four-
teenth Amendment issue detracts from the force of the decision.
The difference of opinion primarily arose over the efficacy of con-
sidering a state constitutional issue upon which the state courts had
not had the opportunity of interpreting. It is by no means certain
that a like result would have obtained had the discriminating
characteristic seized upon by the minority, been found constitution-
ally valid by the state courts. Yet the majority, consistent with
its prior rulings,49 recognized the burden levied upon reimburse-
ment plans by the Equal Protection Clause. Such plans must be
free of arbitrary discriminations which place the indigent in a posi-
tion inferior to that occupied by non-indigents or other civil debtors.
But neither the singling out of indigent criminal defendants nor
the limitation of its application to convicted persons, constitutes the
type of irrational distinction necessary to invalidate the plan.
47. The prerequisites of a constitutional recoupment scheme have been
anticipated. See supra, 67 MICH. L.R. at 1413-1414.
48. Id. at n.78.
49. Supra note 13.
It is apparent then, that within narrow limits, the States may
institute a practice of recouping at least a portion of their costs
of criminal prosecution. The extent to which they choose to do
so will depend upon the somewhat doubtful practical wisdom50 of
pursuing such a course now that the constitutional obstacles have
been more clearly defined.
MARK M. HORGAN
50. Supra note 12.
